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Many, if not most, copyright cases of alleged indirect liability for copyright infringement 
arise in platform markets: One of the litigating parties is a market intermediary that 
connects members of different distinct groups.  Indirect liability for copyright 
infringement is still controversial and frequently litigated.  This paper develops an 
analytical framework that is applicable to many of the debated cases.  The presented 
framework offers strong justifications for the imposition of indirect liability for copyright 
infringement in platform markets and offers tools to establish certain elements of indirect 
liability for copyright infringement.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Many, if not most, copyright cases of indirect liability for copyright infringement 
arise in platform markets: One of the litigating parties is a market intermediary that 
connects members of different distinct groups.1  Platforms are subspecies of networks but 
unlike generic networks that connect members of the same group, platforms connect 
members of different groups.2  To illustrate, in Sony v. Universal City Studios,3 copyright 
owners of television programs connected audiences with advertisers and generated 
revenues from this connection.  The copyright owners sued VCR manufacturers, among 
other grounds, for undermining this connection by enabling VCR users to skip 
commercials with the fast-forward button.  In A&M Records v. Napster4 and in Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster,5 file-sharing services established networks of users 
who swapped copyrighted files and connected (or planned to connect) these networks of 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 In economics literature, platform markets are often referred to as “multisided markets” because 
each distinct group is treated as one of the market “sides.”  For an excellent, accessible introduction to 
platform economics, see David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets 
withTwo-Sided Platforms, NBER Working Paper Series No. 11603 (Sep. 2005). For prominent works on 
the properties of platform markets, see Bernard Caillaud & Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition 
Among Intermediation Service Providers, 34 RAND J. ECON. 309 (2003); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean 
Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N. 990 (2003).  See also DANIEL 
F. SPULBER, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE: INTERMEDIARIES AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM (1999). 
2 For a comprehensive survey of network economics, see Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, 
Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (forthcoming). 
3 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
4 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
5 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). 
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users to advertisers from whom they collected (or planned to collect) revenues.6  
Copyright owners sued these file-sharing services for facilitating copyright infringement 
by their users.  Even the classic example of “dance halls” that is frequently mentioned in 
copyright cases of indirect liability involves platforms:  Dance hall owners who connect 
audiences with music bands that play copyrighted music without authorization may be 
found liable as indirect infringers.7  Similarly, in the days of the silent motion pictures, 
some exhibitors who connected movie distributors, moviegoers, and musicians who 
played music during show times, were found liable for unauthorized performances of 
copyrighted compositions by the musicians.8   
As the foregoing examples illustrate, indirect liability, or third-party liability, is 
imposed on a party who is not the most-immediate wrongdoer.9  It is imposed for 
facilitating the wrongdoing and, in certain circumstances, for not exercising the power to 
deter wrongdoing or the power to force internalization of the costs of wrongdoing.  
Imposing legal liability on the non-most-immediate wrongdoer requires very good 
justifications, since, practically, most unlawful acts could be attributed to third parties.  
Indeed, prosecutors and victims often seek to impose liability on manufacturers and 
sellers of equipment and tools used for unlawful acts, among other reasons, because such 
manufacturers and sellers indirectly benefit from the illegal activities.   
The economic and legal justifications for indirect liability are context dependent.  
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Napster was sued during its penetration stage in which it collected no revenues. Its potential 
revenue sources included various forms of advertising and marketing to its users. A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2000).  Grokster and StreamCast took advantage of 
Napster’s fallout, had a very short penetration stage, and started collecting revenues from advertisers soon 
after it launched its platform.  Grokster, • U.S. at •. 
7 See, e.g., Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929); 
KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee’s Co., 432 F.Supp. 72 (D.C.Mo. 1977).  Cf. Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 
F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding that a landlord who leased premises to a direct infringer for a fixed rental 
and did not participate directly in any infringing activity was not liable for contributory infringement). 
8 See, e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470 (D.C.S.C. 1924). 
9 See generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement 
Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); Reinier Kraakman, Third-Party  Liability, in THE PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW vol. 3, 583 (1998). 
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Thus far, the study of indirect liability for copyright infringement has failed to recognize 
the multisided nature of the markets in a large portion of the cases, among other reasons, 
due to the traditional focus of copyright law on technologies rather than on market 
structure and characteristics.10  This Article offers a framework for the analysis of 
indirect liability for copyright infringement in platform markets.   
The Article advances two new justifications for indirect liability for copyright 
infringement in platform markets.  First, in platform markets, indirect liability is justified 
when an alleged indirect infringer piggybacks a platform by capturing value created by 
the platform at the expense of the platform and the connecting parties.  The social costs 
generated by such piggybackers go beyond than the costs associated with copyright 
infringements.  Piggybackers undermine the commercial viability of the platform markets 
in which they operate and these social costs are added to those associated with copyright 
infringements.  Second, indirect liability is justified when the alleged indirect infringer is 
a freeloader, who operates a platform whose operation costs are externalized on other 
parties.  One generic example of piggybackers include sellers of products that modify the 
use of a platform in a way that harms the interests of the platform owners or one of the 
groups connected through the platform.11  Another generic example of piggybackers 
includes sellers of “advertising removers” to be used in platforms that connect audiences 
and advertisers.12  A generic example of freeloaders includes platform owners that 
capture audiences through the provision of a cheap opportunity to infringe copyrights of 
others.13   
                                                                                                                                                 
10 See, e.g.,  Sony, 464 U.S. at 430-31: 
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes 
in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment – the 
printing press – that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection.  Repeatedly, 
as new developments have occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has 
fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary.    
11 See Section II.A infra. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Section II.B infra. 
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The applicability of the presented framework and justifications only to certain 
market structures does not significantly limit their practical importance.  As stated at the 
outset, this analysis is applicable to many, if not most, cases of indirect liability for 
copyright infringement and to the vast majority of high-profile cases of indirect copyright 
infringement.  
The plan of this paper is as follows.  Section I introduces some basic principles of 
platform economics, generic types of platforms, and typical forms of such platforms that 
are related to copyrighted technologies and materials.  Section II presents the role of 
alleged indirect infringers in the context of the platform world.  Section III draws certain 
legal and policy implications regarding the justifications for indirect liability for 
copyright infringement and shows how the analysis could be used to assist in establishing 
indirect liability. Section IV concludes.  
I.  TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INDIRECT LIABILITY 
Present justifications for indirect liability for copyright infringement focus on the 
practicability and convenience of copyright enforcement.  For example, William Landes 
and Douglas Lichtman argue that “the argument in favor of [indirect] liability is that third 
parties are often in a good position to discourage copyright infringement either by 
monitoring direct infringement or [by] redesigning their technologies to make 
infringement more difficult.”14  A similar view was adopted by Judge Richard Posner in 
the Aimster Copyright Litigation:15
Recognizing the impracticability or futility of copyright owner’s suing a 
multitude of individual infringers … the law allows a copyright holder to sue a 
contributor to the infringement instead, in effect as an aider or abettor. …  
If a breach of … a copyright license … can be prevented most effectively by 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An 
Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 395, 396 (2003).  See also William Landes & Douglas 
Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: Napster and Beyond, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 113 
(2003). 
15 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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actions taken by a third party, it makes sense to have a legal mechanism for 
placing liability for the consequences of the breach on him as well as on the party 
that broke the contract. 
 
In Grokster, the Supreme Court adopted this reasoning:16
When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may 
be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct 
infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the 
copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious 
infringement. 
 
Although these types of practicability and convenience arguments have some 
appeal, they are not as strong as justifications that focus on harmful actions and, 
therefore, their convincing power is somewhat limited.  The analytical framework 
developed in this paper offers such independent justifications, thereby presenting a 
stronger case for imposing liability for indirect copyright infringement. 
II.  BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PLATFORM ECONOMICS 
A.  Direct and Indirect Network Externalities 
The basic formulation of network externalities as positive or negative returns to 
scale in consumption17 has stimulated extensive writing in almost every legal field.18  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
16 Grokster, • U.S. at •. 
17 The two most influential definitions of network externalities were provided by two pioneering 
articles published in 1985: Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 
16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70 (1985) (“There may be a direct “network externality” in the sense that one’s 
consumer’s value for a good increases when another consumer has a compatible good.”); Michael L. Katz 
& Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 
(1985) (“There are many products for which the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good 
increases with the number of other agents consuming the good.”). 
18 See, e.g., Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal 
Systems, 22 YALE L & POL’Y REV. 1 (2001) (studying the general applicability of network economics to the 
formation and evolution of legal systems); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. 
L. Rev. 813 (1998) (studying the general applicability of network economics to law making and evolution 
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standard legal analysis though is focused, explicitly or implicitly, on direct network 
externalities.  Direct network externalities are, generally, the value of a product that is 
related to the number of consumers who use the same or compatible product.19  In other 
words, the value added to the intrinsic value of using a product.  For example, for a word-
processing user, the value of the software normally increases with the number of users 
who use the same software due to the advantages of swapping files.  In other 
circumstances, the entire value of a product is related to the number of users of that 
product.  For instance, the value of file-sharing software, fax machines, e-mail services, 
and telephone services is related almost solely to the number of users who use these 
products, as they are used for communication among users.  Examples of negative 
network externalities are communication and electricity networks that may become 
overloaded when the number of users (or scope of use) increases, highways that get 
crowded when the number of drivers goes up, and fashion goods that tend to lose their 
uniqueness value when commonly used.  
In many markets, however, the impact of indirect network externalities on the 
value of a product may be greater than the impact of the direct network externalities.  
Indirect network externalities describe the impact of the number of type A users of a 
product on the value of the product for type B users.20  For example, the value of a credit 
                                                                                                                                                 
of norms); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 
757 (1995) (discussing various implications of network externalities in corporate law); Mark A. Lamley & 
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998) (reviewing 
legal implications in antitrust, intellectual property, telecommunication, standard regulation,  corporations, 
and contracts); Brant T. Lee, The Network Economic Effects of Whiteness, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1259 (2004) 
(applying network economics to critical race theory).  
19 For simplicity, the foregoing discussion uses the phrases “the same product” or “a compatible 
product” as interchangeable.  The distinction between identical and compatible products has some 
important policy implications.  See generally Farrell & Saloner, supra note 17; Joseph Farrell & Garth 
Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. 
ECON. REV. 940 (1986); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of 
Interfaces, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 9 (1992); Katz & Shapiro, supra note 17. 
20 Confusion between direct and indirect network externalities is common in the literature.  One 
source of this confusion is the ill-defined distinctions between direct and indirect network externalities in 
the early network economics literature.  See, e.g., Farrell & Saloner, ibid; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. 
Margolis, Understanding Network Externalities, 17 RES. L. & ECON. 1 (1994); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. 
Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1994). 
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card for a credit card holder is related to the number of merchants that accept this credit 
card, rather than to the number of other credit card holders.  Similarly, the value of a flea 
market (or a mall) to shoppers depends on the number of merchants, rather than on the 
number of shoppers.21 Generally, the number of type A users (or the scope of their 
activities) indirectly affect type B users and this is why this value is commonly known as 
indirect network externalities.22  Markets that exhibit significant indirect network 
externalities are multisided markets.23  Frequently, interactions among members of 
distinct groups in multisided markets are conducted through third parties.  Such third 
parties are platforms and the markets in which they operate are platform markets.  
The presentation of marketplaces as “multisided markets” with indirect network 
externalities is rather intuitive and, essentially, is just a framing of widely-familiar 
economic institutions.  All merchants and shoppers understand that the “market” is a 
platform that facilitates interactions among sellers and buyers and that, for each player, 
the value of this platform increases with the number of players of other types.  This 
understanding does not change with the commercial title of the market, whether it is a 
mall, a flea market, or an exchange.  The value of this framing, however, is in extending 
this intuitive framework to abstract marketplaces and in exploring the unique market 
characteristics beyond the straightforward observation that sellers are better off when the 
number of buyers goes up and vice versa.  The following sections develop further the 
understanding of platforms.  
                                                                                                                                                 
21 For a more elaborated discussion, see David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the 
Antitrust Economics of Networks, 10 ANTITRUST 36 (1996). 
22 See generally Katz & Shapiro, supra note 17; Chien-fu Chou & Oz Shy, Network Effects 
without Network Externalities, 8 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 259 (1990); Matthew T. Clements, Direct and 
Indirect Network Effects: Are They Equivalent?, 22 INT’L J. INDUST. ORG. 633 (2004). 
23 For an excellent introduction of platform economics in antitrust law, see David Evans, The 
Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. REG. 325 (2003). For utilization of the 
concept of indirect network externalities in legal literature, see for example Brett M. Frischmann, An 
Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005); Lamley & 
McGowan, supra note 18, at 488-500 (discussing indirect network externalities without using the term); 
James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for 
Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. REG. 39 (2000); Bradley H. Weidenhammer, Compatibility And 
Interconnection Pricing In The Airline Industry: A Proposal for Reform, 114 YALE. L. J. 405 (2004). 
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B.  Types of Platforms and Pricing Characteristics 
Platforms may be classified in several ways.  David Evans, for example, focuses 
on certain functions of platforms and distinguishes among market makers, audience 
makers, and demand coordinators.24  Market makers allow members of distinct groups to 
transact, audience makers match advertisers and audiences, and demand coordinators 
make goods and services that generate indirect network effect.  This classification is 
useful for understanding the major advantages of platforms: Platforms offer cheap 
physical or virtual trade environments, thereby lowering transaction costs associated with 
the search for trade partners and general transaction costs associated with trade.  In some 
instances, such as the video-game industry, platforms create demand for and supply of 
new products.  Evan’s classification, however, says little about the nature of the 
connections facilitated by platforms.  A more useful classification that serves this purpose 
is among vertical, horizontal, and audience platforms.   
Vertical platforms facilitate interactions among “sellers” and “buyers.”  Intuitive 
examples of vertical platforms include standard textbook marketplaces, such as flea 
markets and shopping malls. Realtors and brokers perform the same function in their 
capacity of middlemen.25  Credit cards offer an example of a technology, rather than a 
physical location or a business, which facilitates interactions among sellers and buyers.  
Other examples include videogame consoles that connect game developers (“sellers”) and 
players (“buyers”), the medical resident matching system that connects residents 
(“sellers” of labor) and hospitals (“buyers”),26 and business-to-business (“B2B”) 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 Evans, ibid, at 334-336. 
25 For theoretical analyses of such platforms, see Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, Middlemen, 
102 Q. J. ECON. 581 (1987); Marie-Odile Yanelle, The Strategic Analysis of Intermediation, 33 EUR. ECON. 
REV. 294 (1989). 
26 This system has recently been challenged on antitrust grounds.  See Jung v. Association of 
American Medical Colleges, 339 F.Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004); Jung v. Association of American Medical 
Colleges, 226 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 2005). 
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networks that connect suppliers and buyers.27
Vertical platforms often connect sellers of copyrighted goods with consumers and 
often the vertical platforms themselves are protected by copyrights.  For example, video 
game consoles connect game developers (“sellers”) and players (“buyers”).  In most 
circumstances the consoles and the games will be copyrighted and frequently also 
patented.28  Similarly, computer operating systems connect hardware manufacturers 
(“sellers”), application developers (“sellers”), and users (“buyers”).  Operating systems 
and applications are copyrighted.   
Horizontal platforms facilitate mutual activities or combinations of members of 
different distinct groups. A prime example of horizontal platforms is matching 
mechanisms, such as dating services and personals forums, that may function as 
platforms if they connect members of different distinct groups.  It is noteworthy that 
matching services often connect members of one group and then they do not function as 
platforms. For example, matching services of roommates connect members of one 
group.29
Audience platforms capture targeted audiences for interested players by offering 
such audiences free or subsidized services and goods.  Examples of such platforms 
include newspapers, free television channels, free Internet search engines, instant 
messaging services, and many file-sharing technologies.  The business model of audience 
platforms is very popular among content providers because the production costs of 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 For theoretical analyses of such platforms, see Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, A 
Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 485 (2001); David Lucking-Reily & Daniel F. 
Spulber, Business-to-Business Electronic Commerce, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 55 (2001). 
28 See, e.g., Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Intern., Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). See also 
Kramsky, The Video Game: Our Legal System Grapples with a Social Phenomenon, 64 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
335 (1982) (presenting the role of copyrights for video games in the early days of the industry).  For 
indirect network externalities in the market for video games, see Matthew T. Clements & Hiroshi Ohashi, 
Indirect Network Effects and the Product Cycle: Video Games in the U.S., 1994-2002, Net Institute 
Working Paper #04-01 (2004). 
29  See, e.g., K.S. Chung, On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings, 33 GAMES & ECON. 
BEHAV. 206 (2000). 
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content are high and frequently it is possible to capture the audience attention and to sell 
this attention to advertisers.  This is particularly true when consumers have low interest in 
repeat consumption of content and when the content’s rate of obsolescence is high.  For 
some products, such as news and sports events, consumers have strong preferences for 
real time consumption and they attribute low value to delayed consumption. Under such 
circumstances, it is difficult to pass to consumers the production costs.  When a business 
model of audience platforms is adopted, content providers can use revenues collected 
from advertisers to subsidize the content for audiences.  Advertisers are willing to pay for 
this subsidy because of the attention currency paid by the audiences.30  
In simple words, the audience platform model allows copyrighted content 
providers to sell content at a price below cost and even to offer content free.  This can 
happen when such content providers sell the consumers’ attention to advertisers and use 
the generated revenues to finance the production and distribution of content.  Focusing on 
indirect network externalities: The value of a content medium (the platform) for an 
advertiser is related to the number of content consumers because advertisers wish to 
maximize exposure.  Similarly, the value of a content medium for a consumer is 
indirectly related to the number of advertisers, because at least theoretically a content 
provider may raise the quality of its content when she collect revenues from more 
advertisers.31  Audience platforms illustrate that, at least theoretically, fees charged by a 
platform owner are designed to capture some of the surplus generated by the platform.  
The competitiveness of the environment in which a platform operates and the players 
switching costs generally determine whether the revenues collected by platform owners 
are below or above the surplus generated by their platforms.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
30 The levels of the monetary and attention currencies in audience platforms are generally 
negatively related.  The higher the attention that is offered to advertisers (“captivity level”) the lower the 
monetary currency is and vice versa. 
31 The indirect network externalities may change direction when the number of advertisers and 
level of advertising changes.  First, many advertisers are interested in exposure to certain audiences and not 
just exposure to the public. Second, the ability of a content provider to raise quality by increasing the 
number of advertisers is constrained by the impact of the volume of placed advertising on the value of the 
11 
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Audience platform also illustrate that, frequently in platform markets, one side is 
subsidized by other sides.  In audience platforms, advertisers subsidize content 
consumers.  In certain vertical platforms, sellers subsidize buyers.  For example, malls 
offer shoppers various subsidized or free services, such as parking, air conditioning, rest 
areas, and restrooms.  The costs of these services are passed to the sellers who benefit 
from the indirect externalities related to the number of shoppers.  In other vertical 
platforms, buyers may subsidize sellers.  For example, software platforms, such as 
operating systems, often subsidize application developers with fees charged to end users.  
Horizontal platforms often regulate supply and demand by subsidizing certain groups 
when there is an asymmetric supply of and demand for group members.  For example, 
certain dating institutions regulate the matching dynamics by offering discounts and free 
drinks to females and charging males the full price.32  In vertical and horizontal 
platforms, however, subsidizing one side by revenues collected from other sides is not a 
financing device as it is in audience platforms.  Subsidizing one side in vertical and 
horizontal platform is conducted to regulate demand and supply and to overcome the 
problem of “getting all sides on board.”33
C.  Conditions for Platform Survival 
Most platforms are created by entrepreneurs who are motivated by returns on their 
investments.34  Consistent with many laws that protect and encourage investments in 
                                                                                                                                                 
content. And, third, advertisers’ willingness to pay is constrained by the advertising effectiveness, which in 
turn is affected by the general volume of advertising and by advertising of business rivals. 
32 For a detailed discussion of these examples and others, see Evans, supra note 23. 
33 For studies of the problem, see Bernard Caillaud & Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition 
Among Intermediation Service Providers, 34 RAND J. ECON. 309 (2003); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean 
Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003).  
34 This is not to say that there are no platforms that are created and operated for reasons other than 
monetary returns.  For example, Craig Newmark devotes himself to a Craigslist.com a free platform used 
for matching and transaction.  In the summer of 2004, eBay.com, a commercial competitor of 
Craigslist.com, acquired 25% of Craigslist.com.  This passive investment may have an impact on 
Craigslist.com in the future.  See http://www.craigslist.org/about/mission.and.history.html; Cragislist: 
Honouring Nerd Values, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2004, at 59; Idelle Davidson, The Craigslist Phenomenon, 
L.A. TIMES, Jun. 13, 2004, at I12; Nick Wingfield, eBay Dips into Web Classified by Purchasing 25% of 
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socially desirable projects, legitimate revenue sources of socially desirable platforms 
should be protected by copyright law.35   
Platform owners typically collect returns on their investments in platforms either 
by charging parties some portion of the generated direct and indirect network 
externalities, by integration with a group that benefits from high indirect network 
externalities, or from sales of good and services that facilitate interactions among 
members of different sides.  The previous section provided several examples of business 
models that rely on capturing some of the network externalities generated by platforms.  
Examples of platform owners that integrate platforms with one of the market sides 
include Microsoft that integrates an operating system with applications and 
Fandango.com, a platform for movie-tickets that is owned by some of the largest movie-
theater chains in the United States.  Some platforms generate additional revenues from 
ancillary services provided to certain sides in the market.  For example, credit card 
companies capture some of the indirect network externalities generating by trade with 
credit cards by charging vendors a fee pre transaction.  Credit card companies, however, 
also provide financing services to credit card holders and collect a significant portion of 
their revenues from this source.  Similarly, eBay.com offers a platform for buyers and 
sellers and consistently extends it business to draw revenues from complementary 
services such as payment systems (credit cards and paypal.com) and communication 
services (Skype.com). 
In certain circumstances, revenue sources related to integrated businesses that 
benefit from indirect network externalities or to complementary services may raise 
antitrust concerns.  Network industries with positive network externalities tend to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
Craigslist, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2004, at B4. 
35 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DCMA”) provides such protection in certain 
circumstances.  DCMA prohibits distribution of any product or device which: (1) is primarily designed or 
produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that controls access to a copyrighted 
system; (2) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent such a 
technological measure; or (3) is marketed for use in circumventing such a technological measure.  17 
U.S.C. §  1201(a)(2)-(3) and (b)(1)-(2) ( Public Law 105-304, October 28, 1998). 
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concentrated due to the added value associated with the number of members.  Platform 
markets are not exceptional, as platform owners in concentrated industries can leverage 
their market position.  For example, platform owners that integrate businesses that benefit 
from indirect network externalities have incentives to exclude from the platform 
competing businesses.36  Similarly, under certain conditions, a platform owner may 
leverage its market position to market power in markets of complimentary services.  Such 
concerns are not addressed in this paper.  
For simplicity, this paper is focused on platforms whose prime revenue sources 
are fees charged from members.  This analysis may be applicable to platforms with 
additional revenue sources, with required modifications.  The existence of platforms that 
rely on capturing a portion of the generated indirect network externalities could be 
undermined if third parties intervene in the platform marketplace by significantly 
reducing the benefits of one of the necessary groups.  For example, a third party that 
offers audience members in an audience platform an opportunity to evade the attention 
burden undermines the business model of the platform, since advertisers would have no 
incentives to subsidize content.  
Finally, platforms may be socially undesirable despite generated indirect network 
externalities.  This may happen, among other reasons, when platform externalizes much 
of its operations to third parties.37
                                                                                                                                                 
36 Essentially, this was one of the arguments in the Microsoft case. The situation of a system 
designer that wishes to collect profits from complementary parts and to exclude third parties from selling 
such parts is rather common.  See, e.g., Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., 45 F.3d 1575 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (holding that an unauthorized producer of disposable inner containers designed for use in a 
patented system for disposing sharp medical instruments was not liable for contributory liability because 
end users did not infringe patentee’s patent). 
37 See Section II.B infra. 
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II.  THE COSTS OF FACILITATING INFRINGEMENT IN PLATFORMS 
A.  Piggybackers 
1. Types of Piggybackers  
There are three types of piggybackers: strictly positive, strictly negative, and 
hybrid piggybackers.  Strictly positive piggybackers create positive value that can be 
shared with platform owners and connecting parties.  Put simply, strictly positive 
piggybacker increase the level of indirect network externalities in a platform and capture 
a portion of the value they generate. For example, third-party enhancing features for 
video games may increase the demand for the video console and games, as well as 
increase the value of a game for the players.38  The activities of strictly negative and 
hybrid piggybackers entail certain costs for platform owners and for parties connecting 
through platforms.  The difference between these two types of piggybackers is that hybrid 
piggybackers also create value that could be shared by with the platform owners and 
connecting parties.  For example, video recording technologies create value by allowing 
time shifting of content consumption and generate costs by allowing audiences to skip 
commercials. 
From the economic perspective, there seems to be no justification to impose 
liability on strictly positive piggybackers.  In contrast, the costs imposed by strictly 
negative and hybrid piggybackers on other parties may justify the imposition of legal 
liability.  The following section presents in greater detail the type of costs certain parties 
incur due to the activities of strictly negative and hybrid piggybackers.  Section III.B 
discusses the special case of hybrid piggybackers. 
2. The Costs of Piggybacking  
A piggybacker allows certain platform members to circumvent the platform.  The 
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piggybacker takes advantage of a platform by offering members of certain groups 
services or goods that lower fees paid by those members or that allow such members to 
connect to outsiders through the platform.  In either case, the parasitic activities of the 
piggybacker curtail the platform’s ability to collect revenues and thereby undermining its 
commercial viability.   
Piggybackers should be distinguished from other market players that provide 
means that could be used for unlawful activities, such as gun and photocopier sellers.  A 
piggybacker places itself between the platform and members of a certain group, so that its 
activity is systematic.   Unlike innovators who may undermine platforms by introducing 
new technologies, piggybackers rely on the platform they destroy.39
In vertical platforms, piggybackers often allow buyers to use the platform with 
products of unauthorized sellers that do not pay any fees to the platform,40  allow 
unauthorized buyers to use products of authorized sellers, or allow buyers to create copies 
of copyrightable materials that are intended to be sold through the platform only in a 
perishable format.41  When unauthorized members use a platform, its owner incurs 
opportunity costs and certain authorized members lose businesses to the unauthorized 
members.  In addition, if a platform owner has no effective means to preclude a 
piggybacker, the platform owner is likely to lose authorized members who would find it 
cheaper to be an unauthorized member.  When buyers can use piggybackers’ products to 
make copies of copyrightable materials that are intended to be sold through the platform 
                                                                                                                                                 
38 See, e.g., Sony Computer Entertainment Am., Inc. v. GameMasters, 87 F.Supp.2d 976 (1999). 
39 See, e.g., Peter Grant, To Ward Off New Competitors, Comcast Builds a Mini Internet, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 13, 2005, A1 (describing developments in distribution of television shows through portable 
players that threaten the traditional distributors, the TV networks); Nick Wingfield et al., TV Downloads 
May Undercut ABC Stations, WALL ST. J. Oct. 17, 2005, B1 (same). 
40 See, e.g., Sony Computer Entertainment America v. GameMasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (granting a producer of a video game console a preliminary injunction against a producer 
of “game enhancers,” which allowed the use of unauthorized games). 
41 See, e.g., RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 WL 127311 (W.D. Wash. 2000) 
(granting a preliminary injunction against a producer of a technology that allowed users of music streaming 
services to download the music to their computers). 
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only in a perishable format, those buyers acquire a durable good at a low price of a 
perishable good.42  Under such circumstances, sellers may be reluctant to pay fees to the 
platform and are likely to disassociate from the platform in favor of more secure 
distribution channels.  In both cases, the impact on fee collection and member departure 
may lead to the raveling of the platform. 
Piggybackers are also frequently observed in audience platforms.  Some 
consumers always try to circumvent audience platforms by removing advertising from 
content and evading the attention currency.  In competitive markets, however, lowering 
attention levels by removing the advertising burden ultimately leads to price increases 
and quality declines.43    Commercial-skipping technologies have been brought before 
courts in several high profile cases.  In Sony, for example, several platforms, television 
networks, offered watchers content bundled with commercials.  Third parties, VCR 
manufacturers, intervened in this market by introducing a product that, among other 
things, had the capacity of unbundling the product: VCR users had the option to press the 
fast-forward button and skip commercials. Several copyright holders sued the VCR 
manufacturers for indirect liability for copyright infringement and ultimately lost at the 
Supreme Court.  The Sony court ruled that “the sale of copying equipment … does not 
constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate 
unobjectionable purposes [as] it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses.”44  Some twenty years later, RePlayTV introduced digital video recorders (DVRs) 
that were equipped with commercial-skipping features and could be used to send copies 
of televised programs via the Internet.  Copyright owners sued RePlayTV and its parent 
company, SONICblue, and subsequently SONICblue filed for bankruptcy.  With the 
                                                                                                                                                 
42 For various aspects of pricing of perishable and durable goods, see Barak Y. Orbach, The 
Durapolist Puzzle: Monopoly Power in Durable-Goods Markets, 21 YALE J. REG. 67 (2004). 
43 There are market alternatives for content consumed through audience platforms. Those 
consumers for whom the individual costs of the attention currency are too high may turn to alternative 
content providers whose content/advertising ratio is higher, such as pay-per-view channels, HBO, and 
Showtime. 
44 Sony, 464 U.S. at 441. 
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bankruptcy court approval, RePlayTV was sold to a third party that stripped the DVRs 
from the commercial-skipping and internet distribution features.45
B.  Freeloaders 
Any seller of goods that could be used for legal and illegal activities collects some 
revenues also from those buyers who buy the good for unlawful purposes.  By collecting 
such revenues, sellers indirectly benefit from the social and private costs of illegal 
activities.  This proposition is equally true for sellers of firearms and sellers of 
photocopying machines.46  In the platform world, some platform owners capture 
audiences by offering cheap opportunities to infringe copyrights by illegal swapping of 
copyrighted materials.  These platform owners do not collect revenues from those who 
use their products for illegal activities; rather, their source of income is advertisers who 
are attracted to the captive audiences that are engaged in copyright infringements.  This 
form of audience platforms is socially undesirable, as they externalize costs of content 
required for their operation to third parties.47
III.  LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Indirect liability for copyright infringement may be established under theories of 
contributory liability and vicarious liability.  Contributory liability may apply when a 
party knowingly induces or facilitates an infringement by another.48  Vicarious liability 
may apply when a party had the right and ability to control the misappropriation of the 
copyrighted work by another and had a direct financial interest in the exploitation of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
45 Paramount Pictures Corporations v. RePlayTV, 298 F.Supp.2d 921, 923 (C.D.Cal. 2004). 
46 Section III.C infra addresses the legal impediments to the imposition of liability on sellers 
whose goods may be used for both lawful and unlawful activities. 
47 Prime examples of such platforms are Napster, Grokster, and StreamCast. 
48 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(defining a contributing infringer as “one who ... induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing 
conduct of another”); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); 
Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that a party may 
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copyrighted material by another.49 More generally, in Grokster, the Supreme Court held 
that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”50
Under present law, a forward-looking party that wishes to capture value generated 
by a platform owned by another or by externalizing the costs of its own platform to third 
parties may eliminate the risk of vicarious liability by relinquishing any control over 
potentially infringing acts.51  This Section utilizes the foregoing analysis to establish the 
required elements of contributory and vicarious liability. 
A. Imposition of Liability for Indirect Copyright Infringement 
The traditional economic justifications are centered on the position of the alleged 
indirect infringer as the best copyright enforcer, as the cheapest defendant, or as a 
gatekeeper.  These justifications are essentially focused on the passive roles of alleged 
indirect infringers.  The appealing power of these passive justifications is in overcoming 
the problem imposing liability on a party whose products may be used for infringing and 
noninfringing purposes.  The implicit (or often explicit) assumption underlying these 
justifications is that alleged indirect infringers are in a position to prevent direct 
infringement and, therefore, should not be shielded by the noninfringing uses of their 
products.  
Insights from platform economics offer stronger justifications by highlighting the 
                                                                                                                                                 
incur contributory liability if he engages in "personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement"). 
49 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).  See generally 
Alan O. Sykes, Vicarious Liability, in THE PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW vol. 3, 
673 (1998). 
50 Grokster, at •. 
51 Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 (stating that there is no precedent for imposing vicarious liability on the 
theory that defendant sold a device with constructive knowledge that its customers might use the equipment 
to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted materials). 
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active role of alleged indirect infringers.  As discussed, piggybackers often capture some 
indirect network externalities generated by platforms and intended to be allocated to 
platform owners and members of certain groups.  The do so by offering direct infringers 
devices to lower the consumption costs of copyrighted materials purchased or consumed 
through platforms.  Imposing liability on such alleged indirect infringers is justified 
because their parasitic existence relies on sharing with direct infringers some of the costs 
saved by the latter by not paying royalties and other platform fees.  Indeed, at least in the 
short run, this form of free riding benefits the direct infringers, but its private costs 
undermine the commercial viability of platforms.  The case of freeloaders seems even 
stronger.  Imposing liability on freeloaders is likely to encourage them to internalize the 
costs of their activities.  
One could argue that these justifications have no practical implications, as they 
can be reduced to the familiar general argument for indirect liability for copyright 
infringement.  In practice, however, courts are required to explain how the copyright 
infringements are facilitated and this is one contribution of the foregoing analysis.  For 
the determination of legal liability for indirect copyright infringement, it is required to 
prove the elements of contributory or vicarious liability.  The establishment of elements 
such as constructive knowledge, facilitation, inducement, and financial interests can be 
supported by understanding the incentives of alleged indirect infringers and the nature of 
the environments in which they operate.  The traditional treatment of the indirect 
infringer as a party whose goods are used for copyright infringement by others is too 
crude for this purpose.  Platform economics offers a simple analytical framework for a 
large set of cases of alleged indirect liability for copyright infringement.   
Indeed, the question of indirect liability for copyright infringement may arise also 
in non-platform markets.  For example, the Aimster Copyright Litigation,52 although dealt 
with a file-sharing technology, involved a generic network market.  Aimster’s business 
model did not rely on connecting members of different distinct groups, such as users and 
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advertisers.  Rather, Aimster commercialized certain aspects of the direct network 
externalities generated by its network and collected revenues from these products.53  The 
analysis in this case, however, can easily draw from the foregoing analysis that utilized 
platform economics.  Aimster could be perceived as a platform that integrated 
commercial services that targeted Aimster’s captive audience.  
Notwithstanding, in some cases, such as cases of photocopying services,54 
platform economics offers no assistance in analyzing the economic functioning of the 
alleged indirect infringers.  No inconsistencies would result from using platform 
economics in cases involved platforms and the traditional analysis in other cases.55
B. “Substantial Noninfringing Use” 
The Rubicon that must be crossed to established liability for indirect copyright 
infringement is the “substantial noninfringing use” standard introduced by the Supreme 
Court in Sony.  According to this standard, a person whose product is used by others for 
copyright infringements is not liable for indirect infringement if his product also has 
substantial noninfringing uses.  Examples of such substantial noninfringing uses include 
time-shifting in the case of VCRs and arguably trade in noncopyrighted materials in the 
case of file-sharing technologies.  This standard was interpreted at least by one court as a 
requirement to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of a technology that could be used for 
infringement56 and has been criticized repeatedly in the literature.57  Specifically, it has 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
52 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
53 Aimster’s source of revenues was “Club Aimster:” A service for fee that allowed paying 
Aimster users to download the top-40 popular music files more easily than by using the basic, free service.  
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646, 651-52. 
54 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
55 For a general analysis of indirect liability for copyright infringement, see Hamdani, supra note 
14. 
56 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (J. Posner). 
57 See, e.g., Lichtman & Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement, supra note 14; 
Randall C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423 
(2002); Randall C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and Content, 71 U. CHI. L. 
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been argued that the substantial-noninfringing-use standard ignores available 
technological options to mitigate significantly infringements.  For example, in video-
recording technologies, disabling the fast-forward feature during commercials or making 
this feature inaccurate so that it would be inconvenient for commercial skipping.58
The foregoing analysis emphasizes the active role of certain market participants in 
facilitating copyright infringements and reinforces the criticism against the substantial-
noninfringing-use standard.  While there may be hard cases of technologies for which the 
tradeoff of the potential infringing and noninfringing uses is controversial, in many cases 
the analysis shows that the technology seller relies on revenues collected from infringers 
or from advertisers who seek infringers’ attention.  The utilization of platform economics 
presented in this paper offers simple guidelines for determination of the role of the 
infringing uses of a given technology.  The substantial-noninfringing-use standard simply 
offers piggybackers and cost externalizers safe harbors, should they add their 
technologies noninfringing uses.  A sound analysis should focus on the question of 
whether the infringing and the noninfringing uses are inevitably bundled and, if so, to 
conduct the cost-benefit tradeoff of a bundling technology.  Otherwise, when the 
bundling of infringing and noninfringing uses is merely a technological choice there is no 
justification to discharge the technology manufacturer from liability for indirect copyright 
infringement.  
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is the first to utilize insights from platform economics for the analysis 
of indirect legal liability.  The paper uses the controversial and frequently litigated case 
of indirect liability for copyright infringement.  Its framework and conclusions can be 
applied in other legal contexts and to be generalized with the appropriate modifications.   
                                                                                                                                                 
REV. 205 (2004); Randall C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning Home and the Duty 
of Ongoing Design, Chicago John M. Olin Working Paper No. 241 (2005).  
58 Ibid. 
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In the copyright context, the paper offers a simple framework that could be used 
for the analysis of a large set of cases of alleged indirect liability for copyright 
infringement.   Presently, courts examine such cases in no systematic way and such a 
framework could be used for consistent and sound reasoning.  Specifically, the presented 
framework allows courts to examine constructive knowledge, facilitation, inducement, 
and financial interests that are needed to establish indirect liability for copyright 
infringement under present law.  
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